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The theological turn of postmodernity
To  be alive again
UrszUla idziak-smoczynska
This article discusses the role of religion in the phil osophy of Jacques Derrida. The author con-siders a specifically Christian, affirmative charac-
ter of deconstruction that is found through the biblical 
references of Derrida, inspired by his forgotten master 
Gérard Granel. This line of argument opposes both the 
presence of Heideggerian death drive in Derrida’s sub-
ject and advances the possibility of a genuinely Chris-
tian rebellious subject as an answer to the question; 
who comes after the subject? Derrida’s thought informs 
us about the affective and weak concept of subjectivity 
that might be fruitful for the development of new out-
lines for the social realm of subjectivity. 
The different aspects of the theological turn
Returns to religion or theological turns are so fre-
quent that the phenomenon has lost the character of 
an anti-secular revolution. More and more thinkers 
who declare their atheism attempt to pursue insight-
ful exegeses of long passages from the scriptures. 
Following Walter Benjamin (1974) we can say that 
most of the ‘chess games of philosophy’ are played 
by the hidden dwarf of theology. So far, the encoun-
ter of postmodernity and religion has mainly taken 
place under two headings; anti-idolatry and the 
Nietzschean ‘death of God’. When Jacques Derrida 
spoke about the common root of knowledge and 
faith he was also taking part in that line of thought. 
However this doesn’t pinpoint the originality of his 
thought in the debate about post-secularism. The 
elem ent of Derrida’s philosophy to which this article 
will draw attention is linked with the often forgotten 
affirmative character of deconstruction and seems to 
be inherited from a great master of Derrida – Gérard 
Granel. 
Anti-idolatry or thana-theology?
When the other who/which1 is excluded by the he-
gemonic discourse (where knowledge merges with 
power) is written with a capital letter, He is no longer 
the foundation or the bottom of a possible meta-
narrative but the One who resurrects after this same 
meta-narrative collapse. Therefore the face of God, 
which philosophy will turn to, would be the one which 
expresses weakness, exclusion and opposition. Hence 
the critical thinking of Carl Raschke, who claims that 
the thanato-theology of the 1970s has been replaced 
by an ‘astheno-theology’ (Rashke 2006). No matter 
whether we share Raschke’s critique, which puts post-
modernism and religion together under the heading 
of weakness, it is worth considering the ‘weak God’ 
oxymoron, which aims to elude the critique of power. 
This new type of weakness must resign from power 
in order to avoid the Nietzschean logic of resentment. 
Therefore it should remain attached to Good Friday 
– to the instant of the death of God. This is the line of 
Gianni Vattimo and of Christianity as the religion of 
atheism as elaborated by Slavoj Žižek. The Christian 
death of God is integrated into philosophy through 
the figure of the twilight of the Great Other (Caputo 
and Vattimo 2007). 
On the other hand, by crossing the expression 
‘God’ in their texts Martin Heidegger and Jean-Luc 
Marion present a gesture of radical anti-idolatry, for 
the only possible God is expected to be unknown. 
Marion is one of the few philosophers willing to de-
fend anti-idolatric procedures on the side of power, 
1 I take as granted a hypothesis that in post-secularism 
God changes position from being the sovereign 
almighty summum ens, against whom weakness is 
taken in defence of the position of the weak Other 
under different theological figures (kenosis, cimcum). 
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rather than weakness. According to him, God is a 
phenomenon that ‘saturates’ our intuition (Marion 
2002: 237), He is some sort of superabundance, 
vastly exceeding our cognitive framework. However, 
what makes Him actually surpass this framework 
is the Cross, His death, or His incarnated weakness 
– vide the concept of ‘negative assurance’ (Marion 
2010: 20). The new skepticism is ready to borrow 
negative structures of religion, which guard access 
to God in accordance with the iconoclastic prohibi-
tion of images. This brings about the different mar-
riages of philosophy and negative theology, which 
results in assigning to God areas governed by silence. 
However let me stress that Derrida underlined the 
distinct structure of différance and the God of nega-
tive theology, noting that negative theology is always 
subordinate to a positive theology and ultimately re-
fers to a higher upper level, which must remain in 
default, when we refuse God the names assigned to 
him according to our measure. Deconstruction turns 
a blind eye to that level, aware that with any form of 
negation, paradox, or even antinomy, the same logic 
occurs: there must be a moment where the Hegelian 
Aufhebung takes place and according to Nietzsche’s 
prophecy God dies, because what we are facing is 
only an eidolon consistent with our measure. We de-
sire to leave something stable or safe (Fr. sauf), be-
cause we need a fixed pattern from which and toward 
which we could run our economy. Meanwhile the 
oeconomia divina is governed by different measures. 
Saved by us it ultimately loses its proper nature.
This anti-idolatric alliance of philosophy and re-
ligion leads to allying the Nietzschean ‘death of God’ 
with ‘the speculative Good Friday’ without the hori-
zon of resurrection. For many twentieth-century 
thinkers, in spite of Nietzsche, it is Christianity that 
is favoured as the religion which offers an exit from 
religion (Nancy 2008) while conveying God to the 
cross. Poststructuralist thought discovers in Chris-
tianity immanent structures leading to secularism. 
Nonetheless there still remains another element link-
ing philosophy and religion – referring neither to 
secularism nor to idolatry – and that is the one this 
article will particularly draw attention to. Contrary 
to the above this element is not negative. Its positive 
character corresponds to the affirmative character of 
deconstruction, which was often claimed by Derrida 
in spite of numerous interpretations and critiques. 
This element also fits the endlessness of the decon-
structive project because of its elusiveness, and it is 
obvious that the interpretation presented below will 
revolve around it without coming close enough to 
call it by its name. The reason is that it’s all about 
the name. One of Derrida’s titles Sauf le nom where 
‘except’ echoes salvation (sauf meaning besides, the 
whole, healthy) encourages this research. Sauf le 
nom together with Passions: ‘An Oblique Offering’ has 
been published as a trilogy together with Khora (the 
English edition of all three parts has the title On the 
Name, 1995). The first two essays explicitly concern 
naming and responsibility, but the final part, Khora, 
which pursues the question of difference applied to 
space or displacement of the platonic Khora has an 
implicit relation to name, which this article will dis-
cuss further on in more detail. 
Christian or Jewish survival? 
In the most important book concerning the theologic-
al turn of postmodernity published in Poland “Na 
pustyni”: Krypto-teologie późnej nowoczesności (In the 
Desert: The Crypto-theologies of Late Modern Era, 
2008), Agata Bielik-Robson remarks that the other/
Other is trapped in an ambush of meaning between 
Hegel’s critique of the Schöne Seele (beautiful soul), 
which is an appeal to confront reality and to survive 
this confrontation. While Hegel promises resurrec-
tion after death in the concept, Derrida is charged 
by Bielik-Robson with responsibility for the fact that 
the path of confrontation with negativity in language 
ends in the absence of transition (Bielik-Robson 
2008: 108, 130). Every form of transition would be, 
according to Derrida, a betrayal of the other, another 
somehow encoded in the idiom, in the trace, in the 
wound, in the date, and so forth. But this impact on 
undecipherable coding can be read as a sign of de-
spair over being able to fulfil the promise of a new 
form of subject which would overcome the impasse 
of weakness and power. 
Contrary to Rashke’s and Bielik-Robson’s diagno-
sis – radically different but similar in disapproving 
the weak and death-driven contemporary philosoph-
ical mood – this article argues that Derrida has been 
quite successful in carrying out an attempt at an af-
firmative philosophy with a theological background. 
As he goes about his project to deconstruct the tran-
scendental signifier by working on written language, 
traces, tropes and interpretations, Derrida has admit-
ted he writes against his desire (Derrida 1986) as if 
something that exceeds language was for Derrida the 
desired goal à rebours of an anti-logophonocentric 
philosophy. 
As was mentioned at the beginning it is all about 
the name, because the name given to someone, as 
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in Maurice Blanchot’s novel to a stranger (1951), is 
one of the best paradigms of the language-power al-
liance. A given name is a seal involving the possibil-
ity to call another by one’s name and master the one 
who is called. After the linguistic turn the problem 
with the question of who comes after the subject in-
volves the question of naming. If there is a resurrec-
tion after the death of the subject how to recognize 
the one who survived death or who was resurrected 
after his death? The axis of this dispute consists in the 
understanding of sacrifice, while the opposing poles 
would be its Christian and Jewish interpretations. 
Any form of philosophy aware of the knowledge–
power alliance, trying to stay faithful to the other-
ness of the other must face the sublative movement 
of sacrifice. It must look for that sort of mechanism in 
which the confrontation with negativity doesn’t end 
in dust. While Derrida avoids differentiating between 
Judaism and Christianity, this article will, whilst ad-
mitting as its heritage the Judeo-Christian tradition, 
advocate that his project is more consistent with the 
dynamics of Christian than Jewish theology. Inversely 
Bielik-Robson downplays the fecundity of Christian 
heri tage for twentieth century philosophy as a whole, 
in favour of the Jewish messianic myth. Her point is 
that Christianity is responsible for the influence of 
the death drive in philosophy, whereas the only way 
to get out alive from the confrontation with negativity 
is to be found in the Jewish tradition. Consequently, 
Bielik-Robson claims (2008: 134) that Derrida makes 
an unjustified imposition of the messianic rhetoric 
– which opens to the coming of the other, and the 
tragico-thanatic – which recognizes death under this 
figure of the other. Although she admits that you can 
find some traces of his attempt to overcome negativ-
ity, eventually death is never survived. Against the at-
titude of lambs going to slaughter, who see in death or 
beyond death any kind of virtue, Agata Bielik-Robson 
is looking for a different attitude of faith – ‘the desire 
for stronger, saved life which overcomes death, the 
way desired by the Messianic Jewish tradition, from 
St Paul to Walter Benjamin’ (407). 
Given that Saint Paul is located in the messianic 
Jewish tradition, one must ask how to determine in 
this Jewish messianic and thanatic dispute the place 
of the Christian tradition? We must first refer to 
Derrida’s own partition inside ‘Judeo-Christianity’. 
Derrida combined the messianism of three Abra-
hamic religions with the Greek figure epekeina ousias 
tes, while opposing them to the ‘Khora’ (La Khora) 
(Derrida 1995). On the Greek-monotheism side 
there is a repeated reference to what exceeds being. 
This universe also includes some possible compari-
sons of Derrida’s deconstruction with the negative 
theology, whose negativity, restraint/temperance and 
anti-idolatry is always motivated by a higher level 
(hyper-/supra-) that might imply the reconstruction 
of the temple, the revival of power and of the logic 
of fortresses closed against the other. Derrida’s ‘mes-
sianism without messianism’ also follows the logic of 
this order by maintaining the most restrained expec-
tations. But all of the aforementioned elements be-
long to one side of the newly depicted dividing line. 
On its other side, we encounter Plato’s Khora ‘who 
eludes all anthropo-theological schemes, all history, 
all revelation, and all truth’ (Derrida 1995: 124). 
This lack of dominance makes it extremely difficult 
to understand what Khora is. But before this article 
will offer an explanation it is worth noticing that the 
book entitled Khora appears in the aforementioned 
triptych, where both Passions and Sauf le nom, draw 
on Christian mysticism. 
La Khora
Postmodernity meets religion not only in negative 
figures of weakness or sacrificial death, but also – 
as we are establishing – in rival crypto-theological 
structures of life. Agata Bielik-Robson, depicting the 
sphere of late modernity with an image of the desert 
taken from the Book of Numbers opts for Jewish mes-
sianism, ‘which continues to wade through the end-
less sands, led by the messianic desire to live’ (Bielik- 
Jacques Derrida. University of Florida College of Liberal 
Arts and Sciences.
Wikimedia Commons
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Robson 2008: 14). Whereas the Christian legacy 
leaves philosophy stuck in the ‘wilderness, persist-
ing in a suspension between life and death’ in a de-
featist, death-driven approach. Still a third option is 
given , to: ‘go back, like a prodigal son of nature, to the 
“house of bondage fat”’ (Bielik-Robson 2008: 15, my 
emphasis). According to Bielik-Robson, who firmly 
supports the first attitude, the Derridean Khora cor-
responds to the last, because it contains some trace of 
a pagan immanence of the sacred. This article intends 
to dispute this understanding of Khora, reading this 
figure, after Gérard Granel, in a radically different 
way; but it will take for granted the appearance of the 
prodigal son as the frame of reference. Indeed Khora 
outlines the collapse of the existing rules exactly like 
the evangelical parable of the prodigal son. 
Let us analyze how Derrida introduces the term 
borrowed from Plato. He begins with a citation from 
‘Raisons du mythe’ by Jean-Pierre Vernant about a dif-
ferent logic that is required by the myth – a logic that 
would escape the binary logic of ‘yes’ and ‘no’. And as 
he says Khora reaches us under the form of a name 
because like a name she says more than a name, she 
refers to something/someone alien whose irruption 
she announces (Derrida 1995: 111). And in Timaeus 
she ‘seems to defy that “logic of noncontradiction of 
the philosophers” of which Vernant speaks’ (Vernant 
quoted by Derrida 1995: 88). But Derrida notices 
that this alternation in the logic of logos ‘stems per-
haps only from … some incapacity for naming’:
We must go back toward a pre-origin which 
deprives us of this assurance and requires at the 
same time an impure philosophical discourse, 
threatened, bastard, hybrid. These traits are 
not negative. They do not discredit a discourse 
which would simply be interior to philosophy, 
for if it is admittedly not true, merely probable, 
it still tells what is necessary on the subject of 
necessity … Khora marks a place apart, the 
spacing which keeps a dissymmetrical relation 
to all that which, ‘in herself ’, beside or in addi-
tion to herself, seems to make a couple with her. 
In the couple outside of the couple, this strange 
mother who gives place without engendering 
can no longer be considered as an origin. … 
This necessity (Khora is its surname) seems so 
virginal that it does not even have the figure of a 
virgin any longer (Derrida 1995: 124, 126).
I quoted these few sentences devoted to Khora in 
order to demonstrate that it is with Khora (and not 
with messianism) that Derrida undertakes a ‘bastard’ 
philosophical discourse. In the collection dedicated 
to the memory of Gérard Granel (to which we will 
return) Derrida describes Khora as follows:
Khora the way I interpret her and (desert on the 
desert) is not perhaps on her own, in her own, 
capable of history, of promise, of flourishing 
of neither man nor god. First of all she is not 
herself [elle-même]. Not yet any selfhood. She 
could have given place for all that she will never 
become herself (history, promise, flourishing, 
man or god etc) but she will never be herself, 
nor herself this flourishing. The flowers of 
the desert need her, she does not. She stays, 
without present time, impassively foreign. It is 
not a mother, nor a matrix, nor a nurse, nor a 
metaphorical figure of those congenital women. 
She ignores mourning and stays forever alone – 
without ever knowing that she is alone (Derrida 
2001: 155).2
Derrida’s understanding of Khora as not definitely 
sterile but incapable of becoming herself a florescence 
dissociates Khora from the figure of the mother. But 
at the same time as being barren Khora is not con-
scious of her loneliness. ‘Khora’ is just the sur-name 
(meaning here the name which sur-vives) of what 
she is not, she is the ‘desert in the desert’, nothing 
which could be discovered, seen, desired or fought 
for in the deserted space of postmodernity. ‘Flowers 
of the desert need her, she does not’ (Derrida 2001: 
155). This sentence seems to be a clue to understand-
ing the difference between Khora and the desert it-
self. The flower of the desert is the Rose of Jericho 
that has a remarkable ability to survive drought for 
months and flourish whenever it gets a bit of water. 
During dry weather its stems curls into a ball and 
2 ‘Khora, telle que je l’interprète et surnomme ainsi 
(désert dans le désert) n’est peut-être pas elle-même, 
en elle-même, capable d’histoire, de promesse, de 
floraison, d’homme ni de dieu. Elle n’est d’ailleurs 
pas elle-même, d’abord. Point encore d’ipséité. Elle 
pourrait donner lieu à tout ce qu’elle ne sera jamais 
(l’histoire, la promesse, la floraison, l’homme ou dieu, 
etc.) mais elle ne sera jamais elle-même, ni elle-même 
cette floraison. Les fleurs du désert ont besoin d’elle, 
elle non. Elle y reste, sans présent, impassiblement 
étrangère. Ce n’est pas une mère, ni une matrice, 
ni une nourrice, ni la figure métaphorique de ces 
femmes originaires. Elle ignore le deuil et reste seule  
à jamais – sans même se savoir seule.’
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live above ground as a tumbleweed. It needs only 
moisture in order to turn green and uncurl itself. 
Therefore Khora could have some affinity with water 
as the source of life. But a Rose of Jericho which de-
rives its name from the town that had the ability to 
rebuild itself from the ashes, is not a simple plant, her 
other name is siempre viva or ‘resurrection plant’. If 
this regenerative form of life needs Khora, it rather 
means that Khora consists in this hidden life in the 
desert when a tumbleweed is blown through sands 
of the desert and seems lifeless. Khora is described 
as a mother who ignores motherhood, both flourish-
ing and mourning, but still being undubitably linked 
to life. Resurrection does not need a mother, only if 
under the form of a mother’s desire. 
The desert
This landscape where everything has turned to dust 
is indeed a good metaphor for postmodern thinking. 
Each resurgent order must be taken for a potential 
mirage, which is only a function of desire. The meta-
phorical desert of Judeo-Christian crypto-theology is 
suspended between these two points: Egypt, symbol-
izing ‘the darkness of faith’, and the Promised Land 
forever disappearing on the horizon – desired but 
never achieved. According to the Torah, the exodus 
from Egypt is a symbol of the process of birth where 
the child is liberated from the already too narrow 
womb. The difficulties encountered in the desert sym-
bolize the infancy of Judaism, which like a newborn 
wouldn’t survive without manna sent from heaven. 
Therefore it symbolizes the infancy of a people whose 
faith is not strong enough to go on without proofs 
or miracles, which needs supernatural signs and 
ultimately a brazen serpent to proceed on its way. 
To learn to live in the desert means to learn to live 
without foundation, without a locatable enemy, with-
out temples. Indeed the desert is not a path clearly 
leading to some goal. Different forces operate here, 
including those that suggest a return to the fertile 
Nile valley. According to Gérard Granel philosophy 
should keep in mind the continuous assertion of an 
‘exit from Egypt’ because it will ‘prevent that any fer-
tile valley could develop without the breath of the 
Spirit’ (Granel 1990: 199). This metaphorical exodus 
of philosophy corresponds to the bastard or ambigu-
ous logic that Derrida was looking for behind Khora. 
Granel explains his notion of exodus thus: 
this is what separates the logical fecundity of 
a culture from a land of knowledge and from 
an entire philosophical reign which organizes 
and dominates the variety of ‘fields’, territo-
ries, domains … and it enjoins us to conceive 
(this logical fecundity) not on the model of the 
fertile, but as a figure of flourishing in the desert. 
Because if the ‘wind [spirit] blows wherever it 
pleases’ it doesn’t mean ‘no one knows where’; 
on the contrary one knows: it blows in the 
desert, from the desert and for the desert. But 
what he blows is neither sterile, nor fertile, the 
difference of which, the blend of which, the 
predominance, depends on the answer that 
inhabits our listening and gives it its limit of 
openness(Granel 1990: 199).3
Granel insists that contrary to a philosophy which 
has grown on a fertile ground of culture, the phil-
osophy of the desert only flourishes contingent upon 
our responsiveness; it ‘inhabits our listening’. The 
3 ‘[c]ela sépare désormais la fécondité logique de toute 
culture d’une terre de connaissance et de tout règne 
philosophique organisant et dominant la diversité 
des ‘champs’, ‘territoires’, ‘domaines’ et nous enjoint 
de la concevoir, non sur le modèle de la vallée fertile, 
mais sous la figure de la floraison du désert. Car si 
l’Esprit ‘souffle où il veut’, cela ne veut pas dire ‘on ne 
sait où’: on le sait, au contraire: il souffle du désert, 
dans le désert et pour le désert. Ce qu’il souffle n’est 
cependant ni le stérile, ni le fertile, dont la différence, 
le mélange, la prédominance dépendent de la réponse 
qui habite déjà notre écoute et lui donne sa limite 
d’ouverture.’
Gérard Granel and Martin Heidegger, Séminaire du 
Thor, 1968.
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Christian-Jewish dispute, which interweaves in the 
philosophies of Granel and Derrida is concerned 
with this new life after the departure from Egypt – 
the life of flowers in the desert that is strictly linked to 
our listening. Accordingly, Khora would correspond 
to that listening, the listening of ‘mothers who wake 
up together with the weak sound of the child’ (Granel 
1990: 199). While using this Heideggerian figure 
Granel is quick to add that it is not because they hear 
a sound that interrupts their sleep but ‘the language 
of desire in that sound finds in [the mothers] a listen-
ing that has been not turned off by their rest’ (ibid.).
Discussing the blessing
The desert where philosophy has fled the ‘house of 
bondage fat’ in the fertile Nile valley has up to now 
revealed very different options of survival – the first 
described by Agata Bielik-Robson is messianic and 
remains attached to the idea of the Promised Land. 
The second corresponds to the Khora and her re-
lation to the flowers of the desert – in this case life 
or resurrection corresponds to desire and listening. 
While in the first metaphor truth is expected, in the 
second it is desired, yet desire is not projected into 
the future, but corresponds to an opening inside the 
desert – for and from the desert.
Agata Bielik-Robson has illustrated her hostility 
to the death drive of post-Heideggerian philosophy 
with one of the episodes of Peniel in which Jacob 
fights with the Angel Sammael, who is responsible 
for bringing death sentences, and he wins (Bielik-
Robson 2008: 5, 534). In In the Desert this fight be-
comes the emblem of the vital crypto-theological 
Judaism for those thinkers who are capable of disap-
proving the death sentence which has been passed on 
philosophy. Nevertheless the same passage of Genesis 
is important to poststructuralism because of Roland 
Barthes, who in 1972 presented its own comment, 
at the same time instituting a return of the biblical 
text as the basis for much of postmodern literature 
(Jobling et al. 2001). Jacob in his struggle with God 
was for Barthes the figure of interpretation, which 
must be heterodox, because it wins within the aura of 
the defeated God. Referring to Derrida’s deconstruc-
tion of the transcendental/final signified, Barthes de-
scribed Scripture as ‘privileged domain for this prob-
lem’. He wrote: 
[t]he metaphysical definition or the semantic 
definition of theology is to postulate the Last 
Signified; and because, on the other hand, the 
very notion of Scripture, the fact that the Bible 
is called Scripture, Writing, would orient us to-
ward a more ambiguous comprehension of the 
problems, as if effectively, and theologically too, 
the base, the princeps, were still a Writing, and 
always a Writing (Barthes 1994: 242).
While Barthes eschews the discussion about the tran-
scendental signifier, he nonetheless does not avoid 
this reflection about the fruitfulness of a narrative 
theory of Scripture. Adopting early biblical scholar-
ship methods (lexia) he develops a very interesting 
analysis of Genesis 32. His interpretation of the event 
which takes place by the river Jabbok, and which has 
served as an emblem for the philosophical struggle 
for the blessing of life, will provide us with the elem-
ent so far lacking for understanding the Derridean 
Khora.
 God (The Great Other) through the process of 
interpellation establishes its poles – Himself and the 
interpellated subject – but also institutes the linguis-
tic game between them. Jacob’s struggle with the an-
gel is in fact the most appropriate figure, but because 
of this there is an ambiguity which keeps us asking 
who fought with Jacob? Provided that the angel was 
God himself, how is it possible that Jacob won? Still, 
if it were Satan, why didn’t he answer the question 
about his name, and why, after being asked, did he 
bestow a blessing? The Jewish tradition of a dispute 
with God over the right to interpret the Torah, is in-
deed consistent with the demands of a loosening of 
the linkage between signifier and signified, but it in-
volves a dangerous element from the point of view of 
postmodernism, which is the original blessing. For, 
while linking the episode of Peniel with the issue of 
the conflict over their birthright between Jacob and 
Esau (Gen. 25:29–34) (as it is before the meeting 
with Esau that Jacob fearing his revenge fought with 
an unknown force, and once again ‘won’ a blessing), 
we see the controversial tension between the human 
and the divine plans. Who is in charge of suturing 
the signifier and the signified? Who has the power 
over the blessing? Barthes is depicting the struggle of 
Peniel as the dislocation of the conflict between the 
brothers. He writes:
… traditionally, the line of brothers is in prin-
ciple balanced (they are all located on the same 
level in relation to the parents); equigeniture 
is normally unbalanced by the right of primo-
geniture: the oldest is marked; now, in the story 
of Jacob, there is an inversion mark, there is a 
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counter-mark: it is the youngest who supplants 
the oldest (Gen. 27:36) … we can say in a sense 
that A (God) is the substitute of the oldest 
Brother, who is once again defeated by the 
youngest: the conflict with Esau is displaced… 
(Barthes 1994: 254).
Barthes notices that the natural balance of equigeni-
ture is unbalanced by the law of primogeniture which 
would normally give Esau, the oldest brother, birth-
right privileges. But God inverts the laws of primo-
geniture by bestowing the blessing on Jacob. There-
fore when Jacob wins the blessing for the second time 
wrestling with ‘one’, who is called neither God nor 
angel until he receives the blessing and retroactively 
calls the place Peniel ‘because [he has] seen God face 
to face … and [he has] survived’ (Gen. 27:31). God 
plays the role of the older brother Esau. The basis is 
again equigeniture, on which the divine’s inscription 
serves as a counter-mark.
[B]y marking Jacob (Israel), God (or Narrative) 
permits an anagogic development of mean-
ing: he creates the formal conditions for the 
functioning of a new ‘language’, of which Israel’s 
election is the ‘message’, God is a logothete, 
Jacob is here a ‘morpheme’ of the new language 
(Barthes 1994: 255).
The neutral is, of course, Barthes’ strongest desire, it 
escapes any binary opposition, resisting mastery, re-
sisting speech and decision and remaining in a state 
he calls in French ‘non-vouloir-saisir’ (Barthes 2007: 
257). The Derridian Khora, defined by a resistance to 
the logic of binary oppositions seems similar to this 
neutral substrate. Her motherly figure would corre-
spond to the figure of a mother who equally loves her 
sons. Conflict arises only with interest, with the act 
of gaining a birthright or blessing. Thus the conflict 
arises with realizing one’s weakness, which establishes 
hierarchy and the existence of higher instances , or the 
desire to get rid of this projection by the acceptance 
of weakness. According to Barthes the balance which 
is disturbed by the introduction of a new signifier, a 
‘Name’ is also ‘the promotion of a new status, of new 
powers; Naming is obviously linked to Blessing: to 
bless (to receive the homage of a kneeling suppliant) 
and to name are a suzerain’s actions’ (Barthes 1994: 
255). Along with the name, on this neutral ground 
appears the order of the father (see Lacanian non/
nom du père), the order of interest and power. 
The dislocation that puts the angel/God in the 
place of Esau comes together with a new name – Is-
rael (Gen. 32:29). It might be understood as God’s 
counter-signment for the previous inversion of the 
father’s blessing (27). In that story the mother, Re-
becca, performs an act of treachery in order to steal 
a blessing for the son she loves most. Therefore the 
critical question concerns the subject of this rebel-
lion against God (‘you have been strong against God’, 
32:29). 
Is this rebellion against the law, against birthright, 
exclusivity, choice and ultimately against power ef-
fectuated in one’s own name? Is it a rebellion of man 
against God, life against death (for which paradig-
matic figure we agreed to accept the struggle of Jacob 
with the Angel) or is it, after Hegel, the immanent 
logic of opposition carried by history (prophecy)? 
Or, finally, should we envisage a different possibility, 
which would avoid the effect of the Aufhebung – that 
makes the otherness fall into the logic of the same? 
If we accept the first solution a paradox immediately 
appears, which transforms the weakness into power. 
Indeed an effective opposition defending the other 
triggers at once a new hegemonic order in which an-
other other becomes the new excluded, in which the 
beloved son must take the distant place of the prod-
igal son. 
The Jewish and Christian will to live
In order to discuss Bielik-Robson’s reading of Derrida 
and answer who comes after the subject I would like 
to draw attention to Derrida’s counter-phenomenol-
ogy of the blind, visibly absent from In the Desert, 
and the role of blindness in Derrida’s philosophy. The 
Memoirs of the Blind (Derrida 1993) are written in 
the shadow of two sources of blindness: one result-
ing from a short-lived facial palsy, which deprived 
Derrida of the possibility of closing one eye for a few 
days, the other, permanent, psychological, generated 
by a visually talented brother, whose drawings were 
decorating the walls of their family home.
The experience of this shameful infirmity comes 
right out of a family romance, from which I will 
retain only a trait, a weapon and a symptom, 
no doubt, as well as a cause: wounded jealousy 
before an older brother whom I admired, as did 
everyone around him, for his talent as drafts-
man – and for his eye, in short, which has no 
doubt never ceased to bring out and accuse in 
me, deep down in me, apart from me, a fratri-
cidal desire (Derrida 1993: 37).
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This relationship of two brothers bears a resemblance 
to the biblical struggle for a birthright. In his child-
hood as Derrida was trying to imitate his artistic-
ally talented older brother, he not only experi enced 
the feeling of being deprived of some special faculty 
but at the same time one of being excluded from the 
sphere of sight itself. For it is the incap acity of simul-
taneous seeing and drawing that made Derrida in-
capable even of making the most miserable copies. 
At the same time, as with any sort of curse, Derrida 
noticed the blessing it carries. This curse/blessing has 
given shape to his philosophical inquires. He wrote: 
… a pitiable awkwardness confirmed for me 
the double certainty of having been punished, 
deprived, cheated, but also, and because of this 
even, secretly chosen. I had sent to myself, who 
did not yet exist, the undecipherable message of 
a convocation. As if in place of drawing, which 
the blind man in me had renounced for life, 
I was called by another trait this graphics of 
invisible words, this accord of time and voice, 
that is called (the) word – or writing, scripture 
(Derrida 1993: 37).
The eclipse that accompanied the movement of the 
pencil on a sheet of paper has inspired the idea of 
the primacy of writing, of the primacy of that which 
doesn’t allow primacy because it always defers. In this 
fraternal competition for being chosen, or for talent, 
Derrida discovered the double logic of the pharma-
kon, in which the true witness, the true seer, the true 
artist, is the one who does not see.
Invited by the Louvre Museum to create his own 
exposition, Derrida writes his Memoirs of the Blind. 
His clue-concept is blindness, but most of the chosen 
drawings, apart from some mythological themes, 
concern biblical figures. It is the old and blind Isaac, 
who before his death blesses Jacob instead of Esau, 
but also Tobias, who having lost his eyesight ac-
cuses his wife of stealing. In both cases, along with 
a disability – a physically conditioned loss of power 
– appears a rift for the implementation of a differ-
ent plan. The plan of old Tobias, who was willing to 
Jacek Malczewski: Paysage avec Tobias (printemps), 1904. Museum of Poznan.
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suffer as long as he was following the letter of the law, 
breaks down when he ‘unjustly’ accuses and is him-
self accused by his wife Anna (Tobit 2:14). Therefore 
the collapse of the principles of justice doesn’t happen 
along with an external oppression, or life among the 
Gentiles, or loneliness in the profession of the Mosaic 
laws. It happens within its own house, at the mo-
ment when Tobias hears ‘unfair reproaches’ and his 
sense of justice suffers harm. Readers acknowledge 
this while hearing two different prayers, one after an-
other, of similar structures: Tobias prays with these 
words: ‘command my spirit to be taken from me … 
for it is profitable for me to die rather than to live, be-
cause I have heard false reproaches’ (Tobit 3:6). And 
further we read that ‘the same day, … in Ecbatane, a 
city of Media Sara, the daughter of Raguel was also 
reproached’ and she went begging to the Lord thus: 
‘Take me out of the earth, that I may hear no more 
the reproach’ (Tobit 3:7.13). The collapse within what 
is one’s own, what is internal, what is subordinated, 
and finally within the law itself – this is how the tragic 
discourse perforates the messianic discourse. 
The desert where the battle for life also takes 
place does not introduce an external enemy – the 
people of Israel stand alone in front of themselves. 
The hunger and fear which they are experiencing are 
their own desires. The collapse of faith in the sense of 
their leave-taking from Egypt is their own crisis. In 
the story from the Book of Numbers, where a con-
tinual listing of the tribes of Israel helps to establish 
the order of walking through the desert, the goal of 
the crossing/journey vanishes. God, mediated by 
Moses (or Moses mediated by God), is constantly at 
war with his rebellious and impatient people; send-
ing plagues, punishing the disobedient with death. 
The conflict relates to life – which is constantly under 
threat in the desert (Num. 14:3) and Israel is over and 
over again trying to extort an assurance of survival. 
Meanwhile, God has the face of a father, who leads 
and feeds, but also punishes every sign of disobedi-
ence when his sons want to throw off the yoke of the 
paternal power. Every form of reassuring  idolatry 
created from their valuables will be turned to dust. 
La guerre en Dieu
Contrary to Bielik-Robson’s interpretation of the 
Christian and Derridean ‘consent to death’ this ar-
ticle argues for a different path through the crypto-
theological in order to survive. One of its corner-
stones won’t be a place named Peniel (which means 
‘God sees’), where Jacob won his blessing, but Lachaj-
Roj, the place where Hagar, chased by Sarah into the 
desert, saw the God who sees her (‘thou God seest 
me’, Gen. 16:13). Therefore it will also be a way of 
rebellion (Hagar), of fight (Ishmael) and finally the 
way of those who are blessed at the end when God 
hears them crying. It is this crypto-theological tradi-
tion that informs the philosophy of Jacques Derrida. 
The basic elements of this theology will be similar: 
the figure of the mother (Hagar), the first-born-but 
deprived-of-his-birthright son (Ishmael), the desert 
(Beer Sheba, Parran) and the shadow of death: but 
the resistance against death won’t be a resistance 
against the law of the father but the resistance of the 
mother, who doesn’t want to see her son dying. 
And the water was spent in the bottle, and she 
cast the child under one of the shrubs. And she 
went, and sat her down over against him a good 
way off, as it were a bowshot: for she said, Let 
me not see the death of the child. And she sat 
over against him, and lift up her voice, and wept 
(Gen. 21:15–16).
The desert represents here this neutral ground, which 
precedes the need to choose, the need to struggle for a 
blessing. The rebellion against death does not appear 
in the name of the principle of individuation, but in 
Karel Dujardin: Hagar and Ishmael in the Wilderness,  
c. 1662. Ringling Museum of Art, Sarasota.
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the name of love. It is not directed against God, but is 
discovered within God himself – ‘non pas le Dieu de 
la guerre, mais la guerre en Dieu’ – as Derrida wrote 
in Ulysses Gramophone (Derrida 1987: 46).
The critique of logocentrism is governed by the 
principle according to which each element of lan-
guage in the play of meaning reaches the wrong place 
or reaches the right place only by going wrong. This 
deviation along the route between the sender and 
the addressee Derrida calls using the word destinner-
rance (linking errance, meaning wandering, and des-
tination). We succumb to the illusion that the word 
reaches its goal, that the author of given words can 
control their meaning, whereas writing is not a poor 
substitute for memory as we were reading in Plato, 
but makes us realize that there is no absolute power 
over meaning (the signified) which means that the 
signi fier is always running his own independent 
game. This game is shown by the deconstructive read-
ing of any text. Deconstruction (which is a neolo gism 
borrowed from the French translation of the Heideg-
gerian term Abbau) is not the destruction, but con-
tains a double prefix, which gives it a more complex 
nature: de-con-struere. What is dismantled by the 
prefix de- at the same time serves the con-struction, 
which means a new assembling. Abbau is not only 
the disassembly, but also the exploitation, so you can 
say that Derrida makes the reading an exploitation of 
new meanings from the same set of signifiers. 
This is the aim of the extraction of concepts such 
as ‘sign’ in Husserl, ‘Pharmakon’ in Plato, or ‘supple-
ment’ in Rousseau. Rather than destroying the au-
thor’s intention and discrediting him with their ambi-
guity they bear different fruits than the one advocated 
by the author or a well-established line of interpret-
ation. We might explain this mechanism by means 
of the metaphor of grafting. The incisions made by 
Derrida in the corpus of philosophical works allow 
for a grafting on to adult trees the scions of different 
kinds of fruits. There is no reason why the roots, the 
rootstock of a plant should provide for only one kind 
of fruit. On the contrary, you can even say that this 
type of uniformity can be harmful in agriculture. But 
it is important to note that this practice requires the 
cutting not only of the grafted branches (scion – new 
interpretation), but also the stock, in order to allow 
both tissues to fuse with one another. This incision 
has more than one name in the writings of Derrida: 
the wound, the date, the pronunciation… . The one 
which bears the strongest religious connotation in 
this case is ‘circumcision’, from the ‘Circumfession’ 
written together with Geoffrey Bennington (see Ben-
nington and Derrida 1993) and from ‘Shibbolet for 
Paul Celan’ (Derrida 1994). Derrida is making an 
inverse epochè from the one we know from Husserl: 
along with the suspension of natural attitude, he is 
bracketing the meaning, emphasizing the pronunci-
ation, the shape, the singularity. He remains as long 
as is possible in the moment of baptism, of circum-
cision, when the foundation of meaning takes place, 
when the signifier and the signified are sutured. This 
moment must have the character of wound. The dif-
ference is a wound. ‘It is this differential mark which 
it is not enough to know like a theorem which is the 
secret’ (Derrida 1994: 28–9).
This is ‘secrecy without a secret’ because it has no 
other content than the only coding fact. But in turn-
ing attention away from meaning and turning it to-
ward the ‘significant form’, ‘it becomes a password, a 
mark of belonging, the manifestation of an alliance’ 
(Derrida 1994: 21). Derrida did not forget about the 
other except from language. The structure of the reli-
gious alliance he was turning to – the bodily sign (cir-
cumcision), the sanctity of the letter etc. – Derrida 
wanted to hold up close to the sign, the name, the 
date, or writing, arguing against their easy sublation. 
They remain undecipherable, unique, idiomatic, and 
alien because of the suffering that was inflicted on 
them. The cut does not constitute a manifestation 
of the romantic desire to leave a trace, but takes the 
form of a wound and refers to the other. It is itself a 
trace of the other, to which we can be faithful only 
in this fissuring; thus not making from this wound a 
sacrifice which has any general idealistic aim. 
Conclusion
Drawing to a close we can say that while the Hegel-
ian consciousness was corresponding to the kind of 
messianism that accomplishes the conditions of the 
prophecies in order to accelerate the fulfilment of 
the messianic promise (hastening the course of his-
tory), Derrida’s ‘messianicity without messianism’ is 
more aware of the victims than such an accomplish-
ment requires. Derrida remains sensible to the pain-
ful aspect of the sacrifice, attaching deconstruction 
to those elements and those figures that enhance the 
sacrifice which is to take place. But if a real passage 
through suffering or despair is the condition of a true 
sacrifice, such a messianism without messianic con-
sciousness is required. 
By contrast with a characteristically Heidegger-
ian interpretation of Christianity as being-toward-
death, we encounter within Christianity this sort of 
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messianicity. The night in Gethsemane; the words 
‘God, God, why have you abandoned me?’ is one of 
its figures. What is the difference between the dis-
sent against death ‘in the name of God, who knows 
everyone by his own name’ and this dissent within 
the death of God which is necessary for resurrection? 
Using the language of philosophy we can say that the 
latter corresponds to the fidelity to the signifier, not 
to the signified. The agon called for by Agata Bielik-
Robson, which means a fight for survival in language, 
thus surviving in the world where all that is solid 
‘vanishes into air’ is a struggle for self-creation. It is 
therefore Nietzschean par excellence and calls upon 
man to become god. Meanwhile, the Christian agon 
would be consistent with the commitment to the sig-
nifier, whose singular aspect is not the object of wor-
ship, but an expression of suffering. Singularity is not 
an ‘I’ maintaining itself at the surface, but an Other 
in his un-understandability and un-nameability – an 
other, who cannot be reassured. No resurrection – in 
the flesh, or in the concept – gives it justice. This kind 
of rebellion or struggle is different from the struggle 
of Jacob with the angel, by virtue of remaining un-
named. Any name that would be given to the reasons 
for this fight would not be the one.
Derrida has admitted several times that he writes 
against his own desire, because he desires presence 
and desires something other than language. His affirm-
ation of writing, text, and the infinite ambiguities of 
interpretation was not an expression of joyful rela-
tivism, but mourning – ‘mourning after the reading’. 
Every understanding, to which we are condemned by 
our lecture, should be covered with sadness because 
of a loss of the singularity. In the ‘Shibboleth for Paul 
Celan’, Derrida wrote: 
There must be circumcision, circumcision of 
the word, writing, and it must take place once, 
precisely, each time one time, the one time only. 
This time awaits its coming as its vicissitude. It 
awaits a date, and this date can only be poetic, 
an incision in the body of language. … It opens 
the word to the other, and the door, it opens 
history and the poem and philosophy and her-
meneutics and religion (Derrida 1994: 68).
This circumcision of a word has to be understood 
precisely as a slit which in the existing corpus (body, 
text, tradition) allows for the grasping of a new 
branch. However, this messianism is built on a previ-
ous opposition, aware that the incision means suffer-
ing. How not to overpass singularity in the name of a 
higher reason – a more powerful life, a survival or a 
resurrection? This question cannot be the equivalent 
of: how to emerge victorious from the confrontation 
with negativity? There is no question of victory. Re-
plying to the question of who comes after the subject, 
we discover in Derrida’s work a new logic of life. It 
doesn’t anchor the game of signifiers in a will to live. 
It doesn’t steal the blessing. Rather it stands next to 
the order of filiation, which is the order of the father, 
the name and the law. It corresponds to the neutral-
ity of Khora, to the balanced relationship toward 
children of a mother who does not have to choose. 
Therefore this logic will be feminine. Her rebellion 
will be only a revolt against the suffering of her son 
(Hagar) – performed in his name. And her desire will 
be so pure that it is incapable of being decently im-
plemented. The life of which she will be the figure, 
won’t be a life ‘stronger and saved’ (Bielik-Robson), 
but brittle. It will not be conquering but accepted like 
the flowers of the desert – ‘resurrected’. 
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